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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Unlike many other creatures who are born with a
set of instincts that equip them to deal with the world
effectively, people enter the world almost completely
helpless.

The individual comes into the world ignorant

and a great portion of his or her time is spent in learning.

It is learning or more precisely, faulty,

maladap-

tive, or incomplete learning that is the source of a great
deal of what is problematic in life for the individual.
R. W. White (1959) has stated that people have
an innate drive to deal effectively with their environment.

This drive for competence or effectance is in some

ways akin to Alfred Adler's concept of "striving for
superiority," which Adler posits as a basic drive in all
people because of their initial inferiority or helplessness (Ansbacher and Ansbacher, 1956).
Abraham Maslow (1968), among others, has posited
that one possible goal of this striving is "self-actualization."

However, the presence of this competence mo-

tivation or "striving for superiority" does not always
lead to the successful realization of this goal.
One important intervening variable which may
1
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account for a large portion of the failure to realize this
goal may be the individual's expectations.
Rotter's social learning theory (1954) specifies
that the occurrence of a particular behavior (behavior
potential) is a function of the individual's expectancy of
reinforcement and the value of the reinforcement for that
behavior.

He defines expectancy as the probability held

by the individual that a particular reinforcement will
occur as a function of a specific behavior on his or her
part.
What Rotter is describing is an expectancy variable and not a motivational one.

The importance of this

distinction is that given the possible universality of
competence motivation, individual differences in actual
behavior may in part be a function of one's expectations.
The concept "locus of control" is a generalized
expectancy variable derived from Rotter's social learning theory which reflects the perceived effectiveness of
the individual's actions.

Rotter (1966) distinguishes be-

tween two types of individuals on the locus of control
continuum, externals who perceive reinforcements as dependent on luck or on others and internals who perceive
reinforcement as contingent upon what they do.

He states

that:
the individual is selective in what aspects of his
behavior are repeated or strengthened and what

3

aspects are not depending upon his own perception of
the nature or causality of the relationship between
the reinforcement and the preceding behavior . • • •
If a person perceives a reinforcement as contingent
upon his own behavior, then the occurrence of either
a positive or negative reinforcement will strengthen
or weaken potential for that behavior to recur in the
same or similar situation. If he sees the reinforcement as being outside his own control or not contingent, that is depending upon chance, fate, powerful
other, or unpredictable circumstances, then the preceding behavior is less likely to be strengthened or
weakened (p. 5) •
The results of this difference in perception are
that
the individual who has a strong belief that he can
control his own destiny is likely to (a) be more alert
to those aspects of the environment which provide useful information for his future behavior; (b) take
steps as to improve his environmental condition; (c)
place greater value on skill or achievement reinforcements and be generally more concerned with his ability,
particularly his failures; and (d) be resistive to
subtle attempts to influence him (p. 25).
Externals tend to develop and adapt poorly to
their environment, while internals tend to learn more
adaptive behavior and become autonomous.

Internals are

confident that they are in control of themselves and their
destinies, while externals feel that they are pawns in the
hands of chance, fate, or powerful others.
Bandura (1977) also believes that expectancies
play a critical role in differences in behavior.

However,

he distinguishes between what he calls "efficacy expectations" and "outcome expectations."

The former represents

the individual's belief that he or she may be able to perform some behavior, while the latter represents the in-
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dividual's belief that a given behaltior will lead to certain outcomes.

Bandura characterizes locus of control as

primarily concerned with causal beliefs about actionoutcome contingencies rather than with personal efficacy.
However, while he believes that causal belief and selfefficacy are different phenomena, he also thinks that
causal ascriptions of behavior to skill or chance can
mediate the effects of performance on self-efficacy.

In

other words, while these two beliefs are different, they
are interrelated.
Although Bandura has made important theoretical
refinements, the thrust of this study will deal with the
relationship between locus of control and interpersonal
skills.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Familial Antecedents of
Locus of Control
The question arises as to the origins of this difference in expectancies.

These differences can, in part,

be accounted for in the developmental histories of internals and externals.

The research seems to indicate

that internals and externals were exposed to signif~

icantly different child-rearing practices.
Chance (1965) matched children's scores on Crandall's Intellectual Achievement Responsibility Questionnaire (an internal-external scale) with their mother's
attitudes towards child rearing.

The author found that

internal control expectancies were related to permissive
and flexible maternal attitudes and expectations of early
independence.
Katkovsky, Crandall, and Good (1967) also compared children's scores on the Crandall scale with home
observations of parental behavior and attitudes.

Their

findings indicated that internal control expectancies were
related to parental protectiveness, nurturance, and the
tendency to be approving and non-rejecting.
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Conversely,
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parental behaviors such as dominance, rejection, and
criticalness were negatively associated with beliefs in
internal control.

The researchers further noted that the

largest number of significant results were obtained from
behavioral observations and not with expressed parental
attitudes.
Davis and Phares (1969) also found that parents
of internals were judged as being more accepting, less
rejecting, having greater positive

~nvolvement,

and ex-

ercising less hostile control than parents of externals.
Also, parents of internals were perceived as being more
consistent disciplinarians than were the parents of externals.

One other significant finding of the authors

was that there were no significant differences between the
expressed attitudes of parents of internals and externals.
The difference was in their actual parenting behaviors.
MacDonald (1971), using a large sample of college students, found that internality was positively correlated with perceived parental nurturance and consistency
in maintaining standards for behavior.
Finally, Epstein and Komcrita (1971) used a sample
of black children and found that external attribution of
success in a matching task was positively correlated with
inconsistent parental discipline and hostile control.
To summarize, the research seems to consistently
indicate that internals tend to come from warm, accepting
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homes with predictable standards and consistent discipline
coupled with nurturance.

Externals, on the other hand,

tend to come from homes characterized as being higher in
the use of physical punishment, overprotection, affective
punishment, and generally inconsistent discipline.
Finally Davis and Phares (1969) found that, while
the parents of internal and external children may have
similar attitudes toward child rearing, their actual child
rearing behaviors differed significantly.

One might there-

fore speculate that this difference in parental behavior
may be reflecting the control orientations of the parent
themselves.
Sociological Factors and
Locus of Control
In addition to familial antecedents, there are
definite indications that minority group status, socioeconomic status, and level of education, also play a role
in the differing expectations of internals and externals.
In one study, Battle and Rotter (1963) used the
"Children's Picture Test of Internal-External Control,"
a projective task, the Bealer I-E (Internal-External) scale,
and a live-matching task with eighty black and white children from middle and lower class families.

The authors

found that lower-class blacks were more external than
middle class black or whites and that middle class children
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were, in general, more internal than lower class children.
In another study, Lefcourt and Ladwig (1965a) investigated differences between blacks and whites in their
control expectancies.

The subjects were compared on three

different I-E scales and a pertinent performance task.
Blacks were found to be significantly more external than
whites.

The authors suggested that because of societal

factors (for instance, discrimination) a large portion of
the externality of blacks could be attributed to blacks'
dubiousness about avenues open to them rather than doubts
about their own adequacy.
Several other researchers have also found that
middle class children are more internal than lower class
children (Gruen and Ottinger, 1969); that educational
level is directly related to internality (Walls and
Miller, 1970); and that socioeconomic status and objective access to societal opportunities is positively related to internality (Jessor, Graves, Hanson, and Jessor,
196 8) •
Some important methodical issues are pertinent to
the societal antecedents of control expectancies.

Rotter

(1966) stated that the I-E scale was primarily measuring a
unidimensional trait.

However, more recent factor analysis

suggests that the I-E scale is measuring a multi-dimensional trait.

Gurin, Gurin, Lao, and Beattie (1969)

factor analyzed responses of 1965 black college students
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to an extended I-E scale.

Four factors were extracted:

(1) Control Ideology (the person's belief about how much
control most people in society possess); (2) Person Control (the individual's belief in his personal control);
(3) System Modifiability or Blame (the degree the person
believes the system can be modified); and (4) Race Ideology (the individual's belief in collective action, possibility of making changes in discrimination practices,
system vs. individual blame and racial militancy).
While Gurin's four factors may not generalize beyond blacks, Mirels' (1970) research cross-validates two
of these factors.

Mirels has suggested two basic inde-

pendent factors:

(1) belief in mastery over the course

of one's life and (2) belief concerning the extent the
individual has impact on political and societal institutions.

These two factors appear to be similar to Gurin's

Personal Control and System Modifiability.
The importance of this two factor approach is that
it can reflect more accurately the sources of influence on
"locus of control," with the second factor reflecting
societal expectancies and the first more personal ones.
Gurin and others (1969) have questioned whether
or not it would be more functional for disadvantages groups
to have an internal orientation.

They have in fact stated

that members of these groups with an internal orientation
would tend to support the status quo, while more external
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members (on the second factor) would tend to opt for
social change.
This hypothesis of Gurin and her associates is
supported by Lao (1970) who gathered data on 1,493 black
male college students from the Deep South.

She found that

an internal belief in personal control is positively related to general competence and that an external belief
in ideology which blames the system for black disadvantages is positively related to innovative behavior as
evidenced by participation in the civil rights movement.
In addition to this Lao showed that the personal and ideological factors are independent of each other.
In response to these multidimensional findings,
Phares (1976) concluded that while there was some commonality in the conclusion of various researchers regarding the dimensionality if I-E, there was much disagreement.
He argued that there was little evidence that such subfactors produce empirically different predictions.
To summarize, the research indicates that social
factors play a significant role in control expectations,
with membership in socially disadvantaged groups correlating positively with externality.

In addition to this

and despite the above-mentioned argument of Phares, it
seems that further investigation of a two-factor locus of
control construct may lead to improved predictions.
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Crises and Locus of Control
Finally, crisis events such as a divorce, death of
a loved one, or other misfortune may account for another
portion of control orientation.

While there has not been

much research in this area, two studies seem relevant.
McArthur (1970) found that young men who received low
numbers in the draft lottery shifted to more external orientations.

Another study (Gorman, 1968) found that under-

graduates scored in a more external direction following
the 1968 Democratic Convention.

A large portion of the

students had been McCarthy supporters and as a result were
quite disillusioned.
Locus of Control and Maladjustment
Several studies have dealt with control orientation as a measure of emotional adjustment.

Distefano,

Pryer, and Smith (1971) administered the I-E scale to
normal adolescents, psychiatric patients, and normal
adults.

They found that there was a significant linear

relationship of increasing internality as a function of
increasing age in the adolescent group.

In addition to

this, they noted that the psychiatric group scores were
more extreme in either direction than those of the adult
group.

The authors suggest that perception of control is

relevant to both normal development and emotional adjustment.
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The research of Smith, Pryer, and Distefano (1971)
also indicates the relationship between emotional adjustment and locus of control.

They compared the I-E scores

with behavioral ratings of thirty mildly and thirty severely emotionally disturbed hospitalized psychiatric
patients.

The authors found that the severely emotionally

impaired patients were significantly more external than
the mildly disturbed patients.
A similar study by Lottman and DeWolfe (1972)
found that process schizophrenics (a poor premorbid adjustment) were significantly more external than reactive
schizophrenics (good premorbid adjustment) •

The authors

suggest that these differences in expectancies to be a
function of long-term learning and not simply current
symptoms.
While severity of psychopathology appears to be
related to externality as suggested by Shybut (1968) ,
other studies have indicated that not all diagnostic
groups are externals.
Harrow and Terrante (1969) administered the
Rotter scale to a group of psychiatric patients during the
first week of their hospitalization and again after six
weeks.

The authors found that the schizophrenic group

was significantly more external than the other groups.
At the other extreme, the manic group was extremely internal, with depressives and character disorders scoring
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between the two extremes.

When subjects were retested,

there was a non-significant shift towards internality in
the schizophrenic group.

There was, however, a signif-

icant shift towards internality in the non-schizophrenic
groups as well as shift towards more normal locus of
control (i.e., less extreme internality) with the manic
group.
In the above-mentioned study by Distefano and his
associated (1971), the authors found that when compared
with a normal group an emotionally disturbed group was
significantly more external.

However, when an alcoholic

group was compared with normals, they were significantly
more internal.
While these differences do not refute Shybut's
argument that severity of psychopathology is related to
externality, these differences may indicate that different
diagnostic groups would require different approaches to
treatment.

However, the bulk of the literature has focused

primarily on the effects of externality and on methods of
helping people to become more internal.
Kish, Solberg, and Vecker (1971) found among hospitalized psychiatric patients that internal patients perceived the ward as more supportive, practical, affiliative,
involving, clear in its expectations, and allowing more
patient autonomy than the external patients.

The authors

believe that psychiatric hospitals tend to take over the
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patient's initiative and that, after a long stay in the
hospital, the patient tends to feel as if he or she has
little or no control over his or her destiny.

However,

those patients who feel that their initiatives pay off
are more likely to leave the hospital.
To summarize, the research is fairly consistent
indicating that people are handicapped by an external
orientation.

Internals tend to engage in more instru-

mental goal-directed behavior, while externals generally
manifest emotional nongoal-directed responses.
Change in Locus of Control
Several studies have important implications for
psychotherapy.

The research indicates that internals are

more resistent to manipulation from the environment if
they are aware of such manipulations.

Externals, on the

other hand, expect control from the outside world and
therefore are less resistive (Bionde and MacDonald, 1971;
Doctor, 1971; Getter, 1966; Strickland, 1970).
In a study by Lefcourt and Ladwig (1965b) the
authors found that the behavior on the part of persons
maintaining external control expectancies could be altered
if new goals could be cognitively linked to whatever prior
success such persons had.
In a second study Lefcourt (1967) found that external control subjects exhibited a marked increase in
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internal control when informed that achievement reinforcement was available.

Lefcourt suggested that lack of goal

striving was due to externals being less perceptive than
internals.

He further stated that by learning what cues

were linked with reinforcement possibilities, an individual
could learn to generalize reward-gaining behavior to new
situations.
These hypotheses are supported to a degree by
Smith (1970) who found that clients who went through a
crisis intervention program in which they had to learn to
solve their own problem became more internal than a comparable group going through traditional psychotherapy.
Even more direct support of Lefcourt's arguments
comes from Dua (1970), who contrasted the effects on I-E
of an action-oriented approach directed at improving interpersonal skills with are-educativetherapy approach.
The action-oriented treatment involved planning specific
behaviors for improving relationships, while the reeducative approach was directed toward influencing the
clients attitudes.

Dua found that while in comparison to

an untreated control group both the action-oriented approach and the re-education approach lead to a decrease in
externality.

However, it was the more action-oriented

skills training approach which produced the most significant change.
One of the things that both the Smith and Dua
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studies have in common is the action-oriented nature of
their treatment approaches.

One might speculate that if

clients take a direct and active part in their own treatment, they are likely to attribute treatment gains to themselves and thereby become more internal.

Some tentative

support for this hypothesis has indicated the relevance
of self-attributions in the maintenance of therapeutic
behavior change (Davison and Valins, 1968, 1969).

The

important point to be made here is that the combination of
self-attribution with reinforcement may be what changes a
belief in external control to one of internal control.
Some Extrapolations:
and Locus of Control

Training

Human beings are, among other things, social
animals and a great deal of their reinforcements come
from their interactions with others.

The individual gen-

erally has a strong desire for positive interpersonal relationships.

However, despite this strong desire, the in-

dividual does not always get wants he or she wants.

Sev-

eral theories have discussed the likely consequences of
frustration of important need areas.

Specifically, social

learning theory leads to the following prediction:
When an individual places a high value on a particular
need area and at the same time has low expectancies
that more desirable behavior will lead to satisfactions
in that area, he will typically engage in avoidant behaviors • • • failure to be rewarded in a strong need
area is perceived as punishing. Thus, whether we are
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talking about a simple expectation for punishment or
the failure to receive rewards that one values highly,
the outcome is the same--a very unpleasant affective
state which the individual will attempt to avoid
(Phares, 1972, p. 441).
Of related interest, Beck (1967) states that there
are three components to depression:
ences in a negative way,

(1) construing experi-

(2) viewing the self in a negative

way, and (3) having negative expectations of the future.
Given this triadic configuration, Beck points out that one
way of changing the motivational pattern of the individual
is by changing his cognition.

He states that

As long as he expects a negative outcome from any
course of action, he is stripped of any internal
stimulation to do anything. Conversely, when he is
persuaded that a positive outcome may result from a
particular endeavor, he may then experience an internal stimulus to pursue it (p. 236).
Many theorists think that interpersonal relationships are one of the most basic and crucial areas of human
functioning (Sullivan, 1953; Horney, 1937; Fromm, 1955;
and many others).

Given the possible universal desire for

positive interpersonal relationships and the negative consequences of having a low expectation of success in this
area, the literature on the effects of what is called interpersonal

skills training is quite pertinent.

Carkhuff (1969b) has researched and developed a
systematic training approach which appears to be not only
effective but also economic.

He states that

18
We can do anything in training that we can do in
treatment--and more. Training in interpersonal skills
strikes at the heart of most difficulties in living.
Systematic training in interpersonal skills affords
a means of implementing the necessary learning in progressive gradations of experience which insure the
success of the learning. In making explicit use of
all sources of learning--the experiential, the didactic, and the modeling--systematic group training in
interpersonal skills provides the most effective, economical, and efficient means of achieving the individual growth of the largest number of persons (1969b,
pp. 130-131).
Carkhuff's thesis of directly training clients in
interpersonal skills appears to be in line with the Dua
(1970) and Smith (1970) studies mentioned above.

That is,

an action-oriented treatment approach which may facilitate
self-attributed behavior change and leads to increased
internality.
Pierce and Drasgow (1969) did a comparative study
of modes of treatment with neuropsychiatric in-patients.
The authors found a training group to show significant improvement over drug-therapy, group-therapy, and individualtherapy subjects.

After interviewing the patients, they

discovered that the patients of the ward found those
patients who received training to be significantly more
helpful than those patients who had not received training.
The authors recommended that
if one wants to create a truly therapeutic atmosphere
in either group therapy or on the wards, one must
train the patients, since they do not exist in isolation from each other but rather are a major part of
each other's environment (p. 298}.
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In another study (Vitale, 1971), patients' improvement in interpersonal functioning was found to be
significantly greater than that which resulted through
modeling in group therapy.

The training was also found

to have affected a general improvement in patients' social
functioning.

Based on this evidence, Vitale stated that

this consistent efficacy in producing improved social
functioning suggests the present program as a preferred mode of treatment in instances where the presenting problem is predominantly interpersonal. Further, the briefness of the training combined with the
importance of the skills it transmits suggest it as
adjunct treatment to all forms of therapeutic intervention (p. 170).
Several other researchers have found positive effects of interpersonal skills training with parents (Carkhuff and Bierman, 1970; Carkhuff and Griffin, 1971),
prison inmates (Devine and Steinberg, 1974; Montgomery,
1974), delinquents (Carkhuff, Berenson, Griffin, Devine,
Angelone, Clinton, Keeling, Muth, Patch and Steinberg,
1974) and ex-felons (Griffin, 1973).
The research data seems to indicate that interpersonal skills training is effective as an adjunct to
traditional modes of treatment if not a preferred mode of
treatment itself.
Finally, with a normal population, Egan (1976)
has developed a human relations training model similar to
Carkhuff's and directly related to the possibility of
changes in control expectancies.
thesis that:

In fact, it is Egan's
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increasing your interpersonal skills can make you
less vulnerable to random social influence for a
number of reasons. Skills training gives you a
greater sense of competence and increases your selfesteem. You become less dependent and freed at least
to a degree, from the need for social approval. You
also acquire the ability to challenge untoward attempts at influence in your regard. On the other
hand, learning communication skills can open you up
to more reasonable kinds of social influence. You
can listen more carefully to what others have to say
and with greater understanding. You are less defensive and therefore more willing to listen (p. 243).
The research on skills training and the studies
on changes in locus of control appear to have a point of
convergence.

It seems highly likely that what is needed

to help change an external to an internal is to show them
that reinforcement is not up to luck but that it is contingent, in part, upon what they do.

Systematically

training individuals in those skills which they need to
deal effectively with their environment seems to be a
direct way to change externals into internals.
ping external subjects with
doing several things.

By equip-

interpersonal skills, we are

One, with new skills, they are

likely to have better interpersonal relationships and
this is likely to enhance their sense of self-esteem and
self-worth.

Secondly, these more positive consequences

are likely to further enhance, reinforce, and maintain the
subjects' newly increased behavioral repetoire.

Thirdly,

as both Rotter (1966) and Lefcourt (1967) have pointed
out, externals seem to be relatively unaware of reinforcement contingencies.

However, with skills training,
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social cues are made more explicit and as a result externals can "see" the path to social reinforcement and
their expectancies are likely to change (Lefcourt, 1967) •
Purpose of the Study
The present study attempts to probe the relationship between behavior change and personality change.
Specifically, the role of I-E on level of interpersonal
skills will be examined, as well as, the effect of increased interpersonal functioning on belief in control.
Specific Hypotheses
1.

Subjects in a human relations training class

(experimental condition) will show a significant increase
in interpersonal skills as measured by a behavioral rating
scale based on the work of Egan (1976) and Carkhuff
( 1969b) •
2.

Subjects under the experimental condition will

become significantly more internal than control-group subjects.
3.

At pretest, the external subjects will have a

significantly lower level of interpersonal skills than internal subjects.
4.

At posttest, the internal subjects will show

a greater increase (over pretest level) in interpersonal
skills than the external subjects.

CHAPTER III
METHOD
Subjects
Subjects were 83 students who enrolled into one
of three evening psychology courses:

Psychology 378--

Laboratory in Interpersonal Relations; Psychology 380-Statistics I; and Psychology 331--Abnormal Psychology.
There were 27 male subjects ranging in age from 20 to 55
years with 14 to 24 years of formal education.

There

were 56 female subjects ranging in age from 19 to 53 years
with 14 to 18 years of formal education.
The students were classified as being either
Experimental or Control subjects depending on in which
course they enrolled.

Those subjects enrolling in the

human relations training course (Psychology 378) were
designated as the Experimental group, while those subjects
who enrolled in the two remaining academic courses constituted the Control group.
The subjects were further classified along the
I-E continuum into three personality groups.

Those sub-

jects scoring in the lowest third on the Rotter scale
(1966) were classified as Internals (0 to 6 on the Rotter),
those scoring in the middle third were classified as
22
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Moderates (7 to 10 on the Rotter) and those receiving the
highest scores were classified as Externals (11 to 21 on
the Rotter) •
The subjects were thus classified into one of two
conditions (Experimental or Control) and into one of three
personality groups (Internal, Moderate, or External) •
Further Description of the
Sample Groups
Experimental Group:

45 subjects enrolled in the

human relations training course (15 males and 30 females).
EXPERIMENTAL GROUP
(n=45)
All Subjects

Males
(n=3)

Females
(n=l2)

mean

33.67

23.80

26.93

s.d.

18.50

5.03

9.78

mean

16.00

15.38

15.80

s.d.

1.25

1.27

1.42

Age
Internal
(n=l5)
Education
All Subjects

Males
(n=6)

Females
(n=9)

mean

28.17

22.22

24.60

s.d.

10.23

3.11

7.21

mean

15.83

14.78

15.20

S.d.

.93

• 97

1.08

Age
Moderate
(n=l5)
Education
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Males
(n=6)

Females
(n=9)

All Subjects

mean

25.67

23.44

24.33

s.d.

7.55

3.91

5.51

mean

15.83

15.72

15.77

s.d.

1.47

1.30

1.32

Age
External
(n=lS)
Education
Control Grou:12:

38 subjects enrolled in the two

academic courses (26 females and 12 males) •
CONTROL GROUP
(n=38)
All Subjects

Males
(n=4)

Females
(n=4)

mean

35.50

24.50

30.00

s.d.

5.45

3.70

7.29

mean

18.50

15.75

17.13

s.d.

4.36

.so

3.23

Age
Internal
(n=8)
Education

All Subjects

Males
(n=4)

Females
(n=4)

mean

24.00

26.00

25.00

s.d.

3.16

1.41

2.51

mean

15.00

15.25

15.13

s.d.

1.15

.96

.99

Age
Moderate
(n=8)
Education
All Subjects

Males
(n=4)

Females
(n=l8)

mean

31.75

25.50

26.64

s.d.

6.85

7.68

7.78

mean

15.50

15.49

15.49

s.d.

1.73

1.24

1.30

Age
External
(n=22)
Education
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Instruments
The primary measuring instrument used for the study
was the I-E scale developed by Rotter (1966) to assess the
individual's reinforcement orientation.

It consists of 23

question pairs plus six filler questions, and uses a
forced-choice format.

Some examples are:

"Many of the un-

happy things in people's lives are partly due to bad luck."
or "People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they
make." and "It is hard to know whether or not a person
really likes you." or "How many friends you have depends on
how nice a person you are."
in Appendix D.

This questionnaire is shown

This scale was used as the pretest and

posttest instrument for the Experimental and Control
groups.
Another measuring instrument, a five point behavioral rating scale, was used as a second pretest and
posttest instrument with the Experimental group only.
The scale was used to assess nine basic interpersonal
skills.

(See Egan, 1976 and Carkhuff 1969b.)

The mean

of the scale, 3.0, refers to minimally effective level of
interpersonal functioning.

Scores below 3.0 are indic-

ative of less effectiveness and greater interpersonal disorganization while scores above 3.0 are indicative of a
higher level of interpersonal effectiveness.
is shown in Appendix C.

This scale

In addition to this, a copy of

Carkhuff's scoring norms (1969, pp. 315-329) is shown in
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Appendix as well as an example rating guide (Appendix B) •
Procedures
The experimenter administered the I-E scale to all
subjects during the first and last meeting of their respective classes.

Subjects were told that the experi-

menter was gathering data on people's attitudes and beliefs.

They were instructed to answer all questions, that

there were no right or wrong answers, and to indicate
which statement of the forced-choice pair that they agreed
with most.
After the first meeting of their class, the experimental subjects were assigned to their permanent small
training groups of 5 to 7 members with one or two trainers.
To control for differences in trainers' style and skills,
equal numbers of internal, moderate, and external subjects were randomly assigned to each of the permanent small
groups.
The training received by the experimental subjects
consisted of both didactic instruction in the form of lectures and experiential step-by-step practice in the nine
basic interpersonal skills discussed by Egan (1976).

The

subjects moved from practicing simple listening skills in
dyads and triads to the development of more complex interpersonal skills (confrontation, immediacy, etc.) within the
context of an open group (see Egan 1976, 1975b).

In
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addition to this, the subjects read materials on the skills
and did pertinent workbook assignments (Egan 1975b, 1976
and Wood, 1974) •
The trainers of each of the small groups made an
assessment of the subject's interpersonal skills, as delineated by the behavioral rating scale, after the first
and last meeting of the small training groups.

All trainers

made independent evaluations and were blind to the subjects
I-E scale scores as well as the hypotheses of the study.
During this same time period, the control group
received no further contact from the experimenter and none
of these subjects went through any program designed to improve interpersonal skills.
At the end of the semester, all subjects were retested with the same I-E scale.

Prior to taking this

posttest, none of the subjects knew that they would be
asked to retake the questionnaire they had taken earlier
as a pretest.

There was a 14 week time lapse between the

pretest and posttest for both groups.
Scoring
Both pretest and posttest I-E scales were scored
according to a standard answer key (Rotter, 1966)

I-E

scores for each subject was obtained by counting the number of external responses indicated.
Both pretest and posttest interpersonal skills
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scores were based on trainers' ratings of the experimental
subjects' skills.

Each of the small group trainers rated

the skills of the members of their respective groups.

In

those groups having two trainers, the trainers were instructed to make independent assessments of members'
skills.

Since the trainers were familiar with the Cark-

huff and Egan assessment procedures, no special training
was given to them for this study.

They were simply asked

to rate subjects' interpersonal skills according to the
method shown in Appendix B.

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Analysis of I-E Data
In order to determine if a significant change in
I-E occurred as a result of the training received by the
experimental group, the I-E change scores were subjected
to an analysis of variance unweighted means solution
(Winer, 1971).

Results of the analysis of variance for

the I-E data are shown in Table 1.

The factor A main

effect is non-significant (F (1,77)=1.63, p=.25), indicating that the Experimental and Control groups do not
differ significantly with respect to their changes in
level of I-E.

The factor B main effect is also non-sig-

nificant (F (2,77)=1.46, p=.25).

This shows that the

Internal, Moderate, and External groups do not significantly differ with respect to changes in their level of
I-E.

However, the AB interaction is significant

(F (2,77=4.97, p=.Ol)

and this indicates a significant

interaction between condition (Experimental vs. Control)
and level of I-E (Internal, Moderate, and External).
The nature of the interaction effects is indicated
by inspecting the cell means of the I-E change scores in
Table 2.

A graphic representation of this interaction is
29
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Table 1
Analysis of Variance of I-E Change Scores
(Unweighted Means Solution)
Source of Variation

ss

df

MS

F

A (Exp. vs. Con.)

16.11

1

16.11

1.63

.25

( Int-Mod-Ext)

28.94

2

14.47

1.46

.25

98.21

2

49.11

4.97

.01

761.13

77

9.88

B

AB

Within Subjects

(N=83)
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Table 2
Mean I-E Pretest, Post test and Change Scores
N

Experimental
(N=45)

Control
(N=38)

Pretest

Posttest

Change

Internal

15

4.40

6.20

+1.80

Moderate

15

8.47

6.80

-1.67

External

15

14.53

12.60

-1.93

Internal

8

4.38

3.88

-0.50

Moderate

8

8.25

9.63

+1.38

External

22

13.36

13.50

+0.14
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given in Figure 1.

This figure represents the profile

corresponding to the simple effects of condition (factor A)
for each of the levels of I-E (factor B).

An equivalent

graph of the cell means is given in Figure 2.

This figure

represents the profile corresponding to the simple effects
of I-E (factor B) for the two levels of condition (factor
A) •

In order to probe this interaction, an analysis
of variance for simple effects was performed (Winer,
1971) •

The analysis of variance for simple effects of

condition (Experimental vs. Control) for each level of
I-E is summarized in Table 3.

The data indicates a non-

significant difference (F (1,77)=3.24, p=.lO) between
conditions for the Internal group; a significant difference (F (1,77)=5.70, p=.OS) between conditions for the
Moderate group, and a non-significant difference
(F (1,77)=2.62, p.=.25) between conditions for the External group.

More simply, the data indicates that the

only significant effect due to condition occurred in the
Moderate I-E group.

By inspection of the cell means

(Table 2) , it can be seen that the Experimental Moderate
group shifted as predicted in an internal direction.
Paradoxically, the factor A main effect while not significant does approach significance at the .10 level.
What is paradoxical here is, that by inspection of the
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+2
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+1
B3 (External)
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-1
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""'
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Figure 1.
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Table 3
Analysis of Variance for Simple Effects for I-E
Source of Variation

ss

df

MS

F

A for b1
(Condition for Internals)

31.97

1

31.97

3.24

.10

A for b2
(Condition for Moderates)

56.31

1

56.31

5.70

.05

A for b3
(Condition for Externals)

25.92

1

25.92

2.62

.25

761.13

77

9.88

Within Cell
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cell means (Table 2) it can be seen that the Internal Experimental group moved towards a more external direction.
These data while non-significant are opposite of the predicted direction of change.
A second analysis of variance of simple effects
was performed and these results are summarized in Table 4.
These data deal with the simple effects of I~E on Condition.

The data indicate a significant difference

(F (2,77)=5.31, p=.Ol) in changes in I-E between the
I-E groups under the experimental condition.

However,

there was no significant difference (F (2,77)=1.12,
p=N.S.) in changes in I-E between the I-E groups under
the control condition.

In other words, the only signif-

icant change in I-E occurred in the I-E groups under the
Experimental condition.

And while all of these changes

were not in the predicted direction, as stated above,
skills training apparently resulted in significant changes
in I-E.
Inter-Judge Reliability for
Skills Data
Mean skills scores for the seven trianing groups
having two rater-trainers are shown in Table 5.

When com-

parison data for these groups was ordered according to the
scoring categories in Appendix B, the inter-judge reliability based on the Spearman rho statistic (Guilford,
1956) ranged from .43 to .90 with a mean correlation of
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Table 4
Analysis of Variance for Simple Effects for Each Condition
Source of Variation

ss

df

MS

F

B for a

1 (I-E for
Experimental Condition)

B for a

2

104.99

2

52.50

5.31

22.04

2

11.02

1.12

761.13

77

9.88

(I-E for the

Control Condition)
Within Cell

.01
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Table 5
Inter-Judge Comparison of Mean Ratings for Pretest and
Posttest Interpersonal Skills Rating (N=33)
Small Group

Pretest
Rater 1

I

(N=6)

2.95
Rater 3

II (N=5)

2.88
Rater 5

III (N=4)

IV (N=5)

2.87

2.94
Rater 6

2.99

Rater 3

4.09

2.72
Rater 4

4.33

Rater 5

Rater 6

3.72

3.53

Rater 7

Rater 8

2.17

2.97

2.68

4.16

2.25

3.05
Rater 13

VII (N=5)

Rater 4

3.11

Rater 2

Rater 8

Rater 11
VI (N=4)

3.04

Rater 1

Rater 7

Rater 9

v (N=4)

Rater 2

Post test

3.39

Rater 10

2.22
Rater 12

2.81
Rater 14

3.73

Rater 9

3.31
Rater 11

3.49
Rater 13

3.56

Rater 10

3.53
Rater 12

3.46
Rater 14

3.60
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.72 for the seven training groups (see Table 6).

Ac-

cording to Carkhuff's (1969b) research, an inter-judge
reliability of .72 would not be considered as highly reliable.

Carkhuff's raters usually obtain an inter-judge

reliability at or above .85 (Cannon and Carkhuff, 1969).
However, Table 6 indicates that five of the seven rho
correlations were significant at the .01 level, and that
the mean correlation of .72 was significant to the .05
level.

Taken as a whole, the data indicate fairly good

inter-judge reliability.
Analysis of Skills Data
In order to obtain a single pretest and a single
posttest skill score for all experimental subjects, the
ratings of those subjects having two trainers were averaged and the mean score designated as their skill score.
The final skill score means and standard deviations for
the three I-E groups are shown in Table 7.
To determine if a significant change in interpersonal skills occurred as a result of skills training,
the pretest and posttest skills scores for the three experimental I-E groups were subjected to a repeated measures analysis of variance (Winer, 1971).

The results of

the analysis of variance for the skills data are shown in
Table 8.

The factor A main effect value is non-signif-

icant (F (2,42)=1.35, p=N.S.) indicating that the three
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Table 6
Small Training Groups Inter-Judge Reliability for Pretest
and Posttest Interpersonal Skills Rating (N=33)
Small Group

Rho

I

.43

NS

6

II

.82

.01

5

III

• 90

.01

4

IV

.80

.01

5

v

.48

NS

4

VI

.88

.01

4

VII

.75

.01

5

Range .43--.90
Mean Rho .72

.OS

N
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TABLE 7
Mean Scores for Pretest and Posttest Interpersonal Skills
and Standard Deviations (N=45)
Group

Pretest

Internal
(N=lS)

SD

Moderate
(N=lS)

SD

External
(N=lS)

X

X

x

SD

Post test

2.64
.28

3.36
.43

3.00
.44

3.58
.70

2.94
• 76

3.42
.71
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Table 8
Analysis of Variance of Pretest and Posttest Interpersonal
Skills Scores (N=45)
Source

ss

df

MS

F

1.35

NS

.001

(I-E Groups)

1.30

2

.65

Subjects within
Groups

20.36

42

.48

7.92

1

7.92

41.68

.23

2

.12

.63

8.10

42

.19

A

B (Pre-Post)
AB

Bx Subjects
Within Groups

NS
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I-E groups (Internal, Moderate, and External) do not differ significantly with respect to their interpersonal
skills.

The factor B main effect is highly significant

(F (1,42)=7.92, p=.OOl) indicating that, a highly significant change in ability to communicate occurred between the pretest and the posttest.

While this change was

highly significant, the AB interaction (F (2,42=.12,
p=N.S.) was not significant.

This indicates that there

was no significant interaction between change in ability
to communicate and belief in control.

The change in in-

terpersonal skills which the factor B main effect indicates therefore occurred independent of the control orientation of the subjects.

Apparently, the three groups

did not differ in their improvement in interpersonal
skills.
Summary of Results
An anlaysis of variance performed on the I-E

change scores of the experimental and control subjects
indicated a significant interaction between condition
and I-E.

To probe this interaction, two analyses of vari-

ance for simple effects were performed.

The results

showed that the only significant changes in I-E occurred
under the experimental condition and that those changes
consisted of a significant shift towards internality in
the moderate I-E group, no significant change in the
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external I-E group, and a shift, which approached significance, in the internal I-E group in the external direction.
A second analysis of variance performed on the
pretest and posttest skills scores of the experimental
subjects indicated that a highly significant improvement
in interpersonal skills occurred between testings in all
three I-E groups.
Thus, while the first hypothesis of this study was
confirmed and the second hypothesis was partially supported,
the third and fourth hypothesis were not confirmed.

More

specifically, these results are summarized according to
the hypotheses of this study as follows:
1.

Participants in a human relations (experi-

mental condition) training program showed a significant
increase in their interpersonal skills.
2.

While subjects under the experimental condi-

tion made significant changes in I-E, only the moderate
I-E group made a significant shift towards internality,
with the external I-E group showing no change and the internal I-E group showing a non-significant trend in the
external direction.
3.

At pretest, the external group of experimental

subjects did not have significantly lower interpersonal
skills than the internal group of experimental subjects.
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4.

At the posttest, the internal group of experi-

mental subjects did not have a significantly greater increase in interpersonal skills than the external group of
experimental subjects.

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Skills Data
The results of the skills training data confirm
the first hypothesis of this study, that human relations
training, as advocated by Egan and Carkhuff, does effect
a positive increase in experimental subjects' interpersonal skills, as measured by trainers' ratings.

However,

these same data fail to confirm the third and fourth
hypotheses of this study, that there would be a significant difference in the initial skills level between I-E
groups as well as in the amount of improvement in skills.
While Table 8 shows that all three I-E groups are rated
as having made significant increases in their level of
interpersonal effectiveness, it also shows that the
groups did not significantly differ in their initial
skills level or in their degree of improvement.
Pretest means in Table 7 also indicate that the
three I-E groups did not differ significantly in their
initial level of interpersonal skills (I=2.64; M=3.00;
E=2.94).

Behaviorally, this means that experimental sub-

jects tended to interact with others in the "good advice"
to the "simple reflective" level of communication.
46

They
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would, at this level, tend to respond with advice and
would occasionally communicate minimal understanding to
others.

Posttest means in Table 7 show that this pattern

of communication changes for all three experimental I-E
groups (I=3.36; M=3.58; E=3.42).

Behaviorally, the ex-

perimental subjects would tend to communicate at or near
the interchangeable level of communication.

At this new

level, they would be likely to accurately respond to others
with real warmth and genuine understanding.
As mentioned above, the third and fourth hypotheses
of this study were not supported by the data.

Several

factors may have contributed to this failure to find significance.

It is possible that subtle differences in the

interpersonal skills of the three I-E groups were not
detected, while a gross change in overall level of skills
was.

Therefore, failure to detect differences between the

groups might be an artifact of insensitive instrumentation.
However, it is also possible that the data accurately reflect a lack of difference between the I-E
groups.

Using Piagetian terminology, Wachtel (1973) has

argued that normal subjects are more likely to accommodate
themselves to their environment than are "disturbed" individuals who are likely to act in an "overassimilated"
manner.

It is therefore possible that for the normal sub-

jects in this study their assimilated belief systems did
not differentially mediate their interpersonal behavior.
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Furthermore, given the "demand characteristics" of the
experimental condition, any personality differences may
have been washed out by the subjects' accommodations to
skills training.

This is not to say that personality dif-

ferences in interpersonal behavior may not have existed
between the three groups in non-training situations but
rather that all three groups adapted to a rather stimulating environment.
In other words, while it might be fair to assume
that the increase interpersonal skills would likely lead
to an overall improvement in the subjects interpersonal
relationships (see Carkhuff and Berenson, 1976) , this is
not necessarily the case.

It is possible that even though

all three groups have the same level of skills, if external
subjects continue to believe that they have little influence on their environment, they may not use their skills
in non-training situations.
However, while there was apparently significant
improvement in the interpersonal skills of the experimental subjects, due to several design and methodological
flaws, the validity of these results may be questioned.
Specifically, because skills data was not collected on the
control group subjects, it can only be assumed that the
experimental and control groups were drawn from the same
population with respect to their level of interpersonal
skills.

Furthermore, it can only be assumed that the
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control group would not have experienced a comparable
change in interpersonal skills.

Because of this lack of

data, it is not possible to unequivocally attribute the
change in level of skills to skills training rather than
to various confounds such as self-selection.
Another criticism, that might be made of the
methodology used, was that the subjects may have been
taught to take the test.

That is, the behavioral scale

used to evaluate interpersonal skills was constructed to
pick up what was taught during training.

Since the ex-

perimental subjects were trained in the very skills assessed by the behavioral scale, they were expected to and
actually did show a marked improvement on the posttest.
While there is some validity to this criticism,
Carkhuff (1969a,b)

has shown that the skills measured by

his scales actually are observable in the subjects' real
interactions with others.

In other words, Carkhuff's

scales appear to validly measure skills that are transferred to real life situations as a result of training.
Thus, it can be argued that Carkhuff's scales provide a
valid assessment of the effectiveness of training.
A more serious problem with the skills data has
to do with scoring.

While the trainers were unaware of

the specific hypotheses of this study, they did know that
they were making pretest and posttest assessments.

There-

fore, as raters familiar with this approach, they probably

so
were aware that an increase in skills would be expected.
Furthermore, as trainers of the very groups that they were
rating, one may validly argue that the trainers may have
been biased--the trainers might have a personal investment in seeing improvement in their trainees' skills.

In

other words, the only improvement in the subjects' interpersonal skill may have been in the minds of the trainerraters.

While this is a valid argument, and while having

trainers rate their own groups may compromise the validity
of the results of this study--the interjudge

reliability

data tends to support the validity of these results.
Specifically, in five of the seven training groups (see
Tables S and 6) the Spearman rank order correlations were
significant at the .01 level with the mean rho correlation
of .72 for the seven groups being significant at the .OS
level.

While this level of reliability indicates fairly

good agreement between independent trainer assessments,
which would tend to indicate that the data was validly
reflecting actual change in social skills, it does not
eliminate the possible role of trainer bias.
In conclusion, because of several design and
methodological flaws of the study, the validity of the
skills training data is in question.

Although a very sig-

nificant increase in interpersonal skills was found, these
results can only be considered as suggestive.

However,

many better designed studies sighted above from the
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literature have indicated the validity and effectiveness
of the skills training approach.

Therefore while the con-

founds of this study compromise the validity of the noted
improvement of the subjects' skills, the established effectiveness of the skills training approach (see Carkhuff
and Berenson, 1976) provides a background of support for
that improvement.
I-E Data
The results of the I-E data indicate that skills
training does have a significant effect on I-E.

Table 4

shows that the experimental subjects made significantly
greater changes in I-E than control subjects.

(Although

these changes in I-E may be attributed to skills training, .the role of confounds such as self-selection must
not be forgotten.)

While there was significantly greater

change in I-E under the experimental condition than under
the control condition, many researchers have indicated
that treatment can be for either better or worse (Bergin
and Garfield, 1971; Carkhuff and Berenson, 1976a,b;
Lieberman, Yalom, and Miles, 1973).

Given the potential

for both loss and gain, the question remains how to evaluate whether these changes in I-E were for better or worse.
Table 2 shows that these changes were not unidirectional.

That is, while the moderate experimental

group shifted in an internal direction, the internal
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experimental subjects shifted in an external direction.
Given this apparent convergence towards the mean with
these two groups, it may not be accurate to characterize
these changes as shifts towards greater internality or
externality.

Rather, it may be more accurate or at least

more convenient to characterize these changes as movement
towards a more moderate level of I-E.
Despite this moderation perspective, the question
of the value of the I-E changes remains.

Several factors

suggest that the moderation effect was for the better.
Specifically, the results of the skills data suggests that
the experimental subjects made significant improvement in
their interpersonal functioning.

Given this apparent im-

provement in interpersonal skills and assuming that the
corresponding changes in I-E were reflecting this improvement, then it may be argued that the changes in I-E are
probably for the better.

Furthermore, the overall move-

ment of the experimental group, as a whole, was in the
internal direction, while the internal I-E group, which
would be least likely to suffer from a shift in the external direction, shifted in an external direction, its
posttest mean score was still in the internal range (see
Table 2) •

Taken together both the configuration of changes

in I-E and the apparent improvement in interpersonal skills
support the interpretation that the moderation effect of
the experimental subjects was for the better.
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Phenomenologically, as a result of skills training
with its focus on interpersonal behavior and its consequences, internals may have come to believe that while
they could have a positive influence on others, they did
not exercise as much control or influence as they might
have previously thought.

For the moderate subjects, the

moderation shift would probably mean that they came to
believe that they had greater influence on others than they
did prior to skills training.

In other words, two of the

three experimental groups may have been moving towards the
belief that while they could have a genuine influence on
their environment, that influence was only partial.
While the moderation effect appears to provide
support for the second hypothesis of this study, data
from Table 3 tends to limit the amount of that support.
Table 3 indicates a differential responsiveness among the
three I-E groups.

Specifically, only the moderate per-

sonality group made a significant change in I-E {F {1,77}=
5.70, p=.OS) while the internal group (F {1,77}=3.24,
p=.lO} and the external group {F (1,77}=2.62, p=.25} did not
Despite the fact that all three I-E groups apparently went through a sighificant improvement in interpersonal skills and that there was no significant difference in level of interpersonal functioning--only the moderate I-E group revised their beliefs in control to a
significant degree.
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From inspection of Table 2, it can be seen that
the posttest mean I-E scores of the internal and moderate experimental groups approach identity (6.20 and
6.80 respectively}.

Given this apparent convergence in

beliefs between the internal and moderate experimental
groups and based on a moderation interpretation, it can
be argued that the internal subjects needed to make less
of a change in I-E to bring their belief system in line
with a more moderate level of expectation.

However,

while the external group made a change in interpersonal
behavior comparable to both the externals and moderates
(Table 7} , they did not make a comparable change in

I~E

(Table 2} •
While the reasons for failure to find a significant change in I-E in the external group are not clear,
there are several possible explanations for this lack of
change.

Spiegel has suggested that a "ripple effect"

occurs when an individual after experiencing mastery in
one area of his or her life, feels motivated to start
making significant changes in other areas of their lives
(Spiegel and Linn, 1969}.

The literature has indicated

that people with an internal vs. external orientation
differ in the number of areas in which they believe themselves to be effective.

Therefore, given the fact that,

by definition, external subjects probably feel less effective in more areas of their lives than either moderate
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or internal subjects and that for a "ripple effect" to
occur sufficient time has to elapse, it is possible that
at the time of the posttest, a sufficient amount of time
had not elapsed for the external subjects to generalize an
increased sense of mastery.

In other words, given a lag

between behavior change and resultant personality change
it may take externals longer to change I-E because they
have more situations to generalize their new level of
skills to than either internals or moderates.
Another possible explanation for a lack of significant change in I-E may be due to "dynamic" reasons.
According to cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957),
if an individual behaves in a way that conflicts with his
belief and if there is insufficient external justification for the behavior, then he or she will experience
dissonance and feel motivated to change his or her beliefs to conform with his or her behavior.

It is pos-

sible that despite significant behavior change external
subjects may have been able to rationalize this change
and may not have felt motivated to change their beliefs.
A related "dynamic" reason for failure to find significant change in belief with the external group might be
due to "resistance."

Davis (1970) distinguished between

two groups of external subjects--"defensive externals"
and "congruent externals."

The former group while es-

pousing an external belief act like internals, while the
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latter group's behavior coincides with their external
expectancy.

Davis suggests that the "defensive external"

apparently while striving for success like an internal
defend themselves against responsibility for failure by
espousing an external belief.

It therefore seems poss-

ible that another factor involved in not finding a significant change in I-E with the external subjects, despite their significant change in social skills, might be
their resistance to acknowledging greater responsibility
for possible failures.
Carkhuff (Carkhuff and Berenson, 1976) has suggested that while interpersonal skills are important,
they may be insufficient to help some people to fully
develop their human potential.

He recommends training

in other areas of life such as physical and intellectual
skills development.

This is in line with Lazarus'

(1976)

multi-modal hypothesis that the more modalities that are
incorporated into a treatment program, the better the
outcome.
What the data may be indicating is that skills
training may be insufficient to lead to a significant
change in I-E with external subjects.

What might be

needed to effect significant change in belief for external subjects is the incorporation of more cognitive elements into the training that would facilitate and reinforce greater "self-attribution."
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Parenthetically, it might be added that while the
external group did not make a significant change in I-E
(F (1,77)=2.62, p=.25), their posttest mean changed in
the predicted direction.

What this non-significant dif-

ference may be reflecting is the relative though insufficient positive effect of skills training.
In partial support of the second hypothesis of
this study, several things may be concluded.

Skills train-

ing appears to have had a significant effect on I-E, that
is, significant behavior change appears to lead to significant personality change.

While the direction of these

changes were not all in the predicted direction, some
were, nonetheless, significant.

Furthermore, given that

skills training resulted in a genuine improvement in interpersonal functioning and that the configuration of changes
in I-E reflected this improvement, then it would appear
that a moderate level of I-E may be more optimal than
either extremes of internality or externality.

However,

despite these apparent gains--skills training may not be
sufficient to overcome an external belief system or, at
least, it may take longer for externals to make a significant shift in an internal direction than expected.
Summary and Conclusion
The data indicates that interpersonal skills
training resulted in a significant increase in social
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functioning.

Furthermore, while skills training ap-

parently resulted in a significant change in I-E, it may
not be sufficient in overcoming an external belief system.

Moreover, I-E did not significantly differentiate

initial skills level or amount of increase in skills.
Although these results tend to indicate that significant behavior change leads to significant personality
change, because of the quasi-experimental design used as
well as various confounds of this study, the generalizability of these results is limited.

If future studies

use an experimental design and control for confounds,
the validity of these results can be strengthened.

Fur-

theremore, some measure of interpersonal behavior in nontraining situations would also serve to clarify the relationship between behavior and belief.

Finally, the valid-

ity of the moderation interpretation needs to be researched.
The experimenter would like to suggest that while
extreme externality may be pathologic in its posture of
helplessness and avoidance of responsibility, extreme internality may be potentially pathologic in flaunting
reality.

The most mature position might be to have a

generally internal locus of control with a slight admixture of externality and a recognition of uncertainty.
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APPENDIX A

SCALES FOR ASSESSMENT OF INTERPERSONAL FUNCTIONING *
SCALE 1
EMPATHETIC UNDERSTANDING IN INTERPERSONAL
PROCESSES:

A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT

Level 1
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the first
person either do not attend or detract significantly from
the verbal and behavioral expressions of the second person(s)
in that they communicate significantly less of the second
person's feelings than the second person has communicated
himself.
Examples:

The first person communicates no awareness of
even the most obvious, expressed surface feelings
of the second person. The first person may be
bored or uninterested or simply operating from a
preconceived frame of reference which totally excluded that of the other person(s).

In summary, the first person does everything but express that he is listening, understanding, or being sensitive
to even the feelings of the other person in such a way to
detract significantly from the communications of the second
person.
Level 2
While the first person responds to the expressed
feelings of the second person(s), he does so in such a way
that he subtracts noticeable affect from the communications
of the second person.
Examples:

The first person may communicate some awareness
of obvious surface feelings of the second person,
but his communications drain off a level of the affect and distort the level of meaning.
The first
person may communicate his own ideas of what may

*From

Car.khuff (1969b).
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be going on, but these are not congruent with the
expressions of the second person.
In summary, the first person tends to respond to
other than what the second person is expressing or indicatin~
Level 3
The expressions of the first person in response to
the expressed feelings of the second person(s) are essentially interchangeable with those of the second person in
that they express essentially the same affect and meaning.
Example:

The first person responds with accurate understanding of the surface feelings of the second
person but may not respond to or may misinterpret
the deeper feelings.

In summary, the first person is responding so as to
neither subtract from nor add to the expressions of the
second person; but he does not respond accurately to how
that person really feels beneath the surface feelings.
Level 3 constitutes the minimal level of facilitative interpersonal functioning.
Level 4
The responses of the first person add noticeably to
the expressions of the second person(s) in such a way as to
express feelings a level deeper than the second person was
able to express himself.
Example:

The facilitator communicates his understanding of
the expressions of the second person at a level
deeper than they were expressed, and thus enables
the second person to experience and/or express
feelings he was unable to express previously.

In summary, the facilitator's responses add deeper
feeling and meaning to the expressions of the second person.
Level 5
The first person's responses add significantly to
the feeling and meaning of the expressions of the second
person(s) in such a way as to (1) accurately express feelings levels below what the person himself was able to express
or (2) in the event of on going deep self-exploration on the
second person's part, to be fully with him in his deepest
moments.
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Example:

The facilitator responds with accuracy to all of
the person's deeper as well as surface feelings.
He is "together" with the second person or "tuned
in" on his wave length. The facilitator and the
other person might proceed together to explore
previously unexplored areas of human existence.

In summary, the facilitator is responding with a
full awareness of who the other person is and a comprehensive and accurate empathic understanding of his deepest
feelings.

SCALE 2
THE COMMUNICATION OF RESPECT IN INTERPERSONAL
PROCESSES:

A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT

Level 1
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the first
person communicate a clear lack of respect (or negative regard) for the second person(s).
Example:

The first person communicates to the second person
that the second person's feelings and experiences
are not worthy of consideration or that the second
person is not capable of acting constructively.
The first person may become the sole focus of
evaluation.

In summary, in many ways the first person communicates total lack of respect for the feelings, experiences,
and potentials of the second person.
Level 2
The first person responds to the second person in
such a way as to communicate little respect for the feelings, and potentials of the second person.
Example:

The first person may respond mechanically or passively or ignore many of the feelings of the
second person.

In summary, in many ways the first person displays
a lack of respect or concern for the second person's feelings, experiences, and potentials.
Level 3
The first person communicates a positive respect and
concern for the second person's feelings, experiences, and
potentials.
Example:

The first person communicates respect and concern
for the second person's ability to express himself
and to deal constructively with his life situation.
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In summary, inmanyways the first person communicates
that who the second person is and what he does matter to the
first person. Level 3 constitutes the minimal level of
facilitative interpersonal functioning.
Level 4
The facilitator clearly communicates a very deep
respect and concern for the second person.
Example:

The facilitator's responses enables the second
person to feel free to be himself and to experience being valued as an individual.

In summary, the facilitator communicates a very deep
caring for the feelings, experiences, and potentials of the
second person.
Level 5
The facilitator communicates the very deepest respect for the second person's worth as a person and his
potential as a free individual.
Example:

The facilitator cares very deeply for the human
potentials of the second person.

In summary, the facilitator is committed to the
value of the other person as a human being.

SCALE 3
FACILITATIVE GENUINENESS IN INTERPERSONAL
PROCESSES:

A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT

Level 1
The first person's verbalizations are clearly unrelated to what he is feeling at the moment, or his only genuine responses are negative in regard to the second person(s)
and appear to have a totally destructive effect upon the
second person.
Example:

The first person may be defensive in his interaction with the second person(s) and this defensiveness may be demonstrated in the content of his
words or his voice quality. Where he is defensive
he does not employ his reaction as a basis for
potentially valuable inquiry into the relationship.

In summary, there is evidence of a considerable discrepancy between the inner experiencing of the first person(s) and his current verbalizations. Where there is no
discrepancy, the first person's reactions are employed
solely in a destructive fashion.
Level 2
The first person's verbalizations are slightly unrelated to what he is feeling at the moment, or when his responses are genuine they are negative in regard to the second person; the first person does not appear to know how to
employ his negative reactions constructively as a basis for
inquiry into the relationship.
Example:

The first person may respond to the second person(s) in a "professional" manner that has a rehearsed quality or a quality concerning the way a
helper "should" respond in that situation.

In summary, the first person is usually responding
according to his prescribed role rather than expressing what
he personally feels or means. When he is genuine his responses are negative and he is unable to employ them as a
basis for further inquiry.
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Level 3
The first person provides no "negative" cues between
what he says and what he feels, but he provides no positive
clues to indicate a really genuine response to the second
person(s).
Example:

The first person may listen and follow the second
person(s) but commits nothing more of himself.

In summary, the first person appears to make appropriate responses that do not seen insincere but that do not
reflect any real involvement either. Level 3 constitutes
the minimal level of facilitative interpersonal functioning.
Level 4
The facilitator presents some positive cues indicating a genuine response (whether positive or negative) in
a nondestructive manner to the second person(s).
Example:

The facilitator's expressions are congruent with
his feelings, although he may be somewhat hesitant
about expressing them fully.

In summary, the facilitator responds with many of
his own feelings, and there is no doubt as to whether he
really means what he says. He is able to employ his responses, whatever their emotional content, as a basis for
further inquiry into the relationship.
Level 5
The facilitator is freely and deeply himself in a
nonexploitative relationship with the second person(s).
Example:

The facilitator is completely spontaneous in his
interaction and open to experiences of all types,
both pleasant and hurtful.
In the event of hurtful responses the facilitator's comments are employed constructively to open a further area of
inquiry for both the facilitator and the second
person.

In summary, the facilitator is clearly being himself
and yet employing his own genuine responses constructively.

SCALE 4
FACILITATIVE SELF-DISCLOSURE IN INTERPERSONAL
PROCESSES:

A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT

Level 1
The first person actively attempts to remain detached from the second person(s) and discloses nothing about
his own feelings or personality to the second person(s), or
if he does disclose himself, he does so in a way that is not
tuned to the second person's general progress.
Example:

The first person may attempt, whether awkwardly or
skillfully to divert the second person's attention
from focusing upon personal questions concerning
the first person, or his self-disclosures may be
ego shattering for the second person(s) and may
ultimately cause him to lose faith in the first
person.

In summary, the first person actively attempts to
remain ambiguous and an unknown quantity to the second person(s), or if he is self-disclosing, he does so solely out
of his own needs and is oblivious to the needs of the second person(s).
Level 2
The first person, while not always appearing
actively to avoid self-disclosures, never volunteers personal information about himself.
Example:

The first person may respond briefly to direct
questions from the client about himself; however,
he does so hesitantly and never provides more information about himself than the second person(s)
specifically requests.

In summary, the second person(s) either does not ask
about the personality of the first person, or, if he does,
the barest minimum of brief, vague, and superficial responses are offered by the first person.
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Level 3
The first person volunteers personal information
about himself which may be in keeping with the second person's interests, but this information is often vague and indicates little about the unique character of the first person.
Example:

While the first person volunteers personal information and never gives the impression that he does
not wish to disclose more about himself, nevertheless, the content of his verbalizations is generally centered upon his reactions to the second
person(s) and his ideas concerning their interaction.

In summary, the first person may introduce more abstract, personal ideas in accord with the second person's
interests, but these ideas do not stamp him as a unique person. Level 3 constitutes the minimum level of facilitative
interpersonal functioning.
Level 4
The facilitator freely volunteers information about
his personal ideas, attitudes, and experiences in accord
with the second person's interests and concerns.
Example:

The facilitator may discuss personal ideas in both
depth and detail, and his expressions reveal him
to be a unique individual.

In summary, the facilitator is free and spontaneous
in volunteering personal information about himself, and in
so doing may reveal in a constructive fashion quite intimate
material about his own feelings, and beliefs.
Level 5
The facilitator volunteers very intimate and often
detailed material about his own personality, and in keeping
with the second person's needs may express information that
might be extremely embarrassing under different circumstances or if revealed by the second person to an outsider.
Example:

The facilitator gives the impression of holding
nothing back and of disclosing his feelings and
ideas fully and completely to the second person(s).
If some of his feelings are negative concerning the
second person(s), the facilitator employes them
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constructively as a basis for an open-ended inquiry.
In summary, the facilitator is operating in a constructive fashion at the most intimate levels of selfdisclosure.

SCALE 5
PERSONALLY RELEVANT CONCRETENESS OR SPECIFICITY
OF EXPRESSION IN INTERPERSONAL PROCESSES:
A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT
Level 1
The first person leads or allows all discussion with
the second person(s) to deal only with vague and anonymous
generalities.
Example:

The first person and the second person discuss
everything on strictly an abstract and highly intellectual level.

In summary, the first person makes no attempt to
lead the discussion into the realm of personally relevant
specific situations and feelings.
Level 2
The first person frequently leads or allows even discussions of material personally relevant to the second person(s) to be dealt with on a vague and abstract level.
Example:

The first person and the second person may discuss
the "real" feelings but they do so at an abstract,
intellectualized level.

In summary, the first person does not elicit discussions of most personally relevant feelings and experiences
in specific and concrete terms.
Level 3
The first person at times enables the second person(s) to discuss personally relevant materials in specific
and concrete terminology.
Example:

The first person will make it possible for the
discussion with the second person(s) to center
directly around most things that are personally
important to the second person(s), although there
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will continue to be areas not dealt with concretely
and areas in which the second person does not develop fully in specificity.
In summary, the first person sometimes guides the
discussions into consideration of personally relevant specific and concrete instances, but these are not always fully
developed.
Level 3 constitutes the minimal level of facilitative functioning.
Level 4
The facilitator is frequently helpful in enabling
the second person(s) to fully develop in concrete and specific terms almost all instances of concern.
Example:

The facilitator is able on many occasions to guide
the discussion to specific feelings and experiences of personally meaningful material.

In summary, the facilitator is very helpful in enabling the discussion to center around specific and concrete
instances of most important and personally relevant feelings
and experiences.
Level 5
The facilitator is always helpful in guiding the discussion, so that the second person(s) may discuss fluently,
directly, and completely specific feelings and experiences.
Example:

The first person involves the second person in
discussion of specific feelings, situations, and
events, regardless of their emotional content.

In summary, the facilitator facilitates a direct expression of all personally relevant feelings and experiences
in concrete and specific terms.

SCALE 6
CONFRONTATION IN INTERPERSONAL PROCESSES:
A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT
Level 1
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper
disregard the discrepancies in the helpee's behavior (ideal
versus real self, insight versus action, helper versus
helpee's experiences).
Example:

The helper may simply ignore all helpee discrepancies by passively accepting them.

In summary, the helper simply disregards all of
those discrepancies in the helpee's behavior that might be
fruitful areas for consideration.
Level 2
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper
disregard the discrepancies in the helpee's behavior.
Example:

The helper, although not explicitly accepting
these discrepancies, may simply remain silent concerning most of them.

In summary, the helper disregards the discrepancies
in the helpee's behavior, and, thus, potentially important
areas of inquiry.
Level 3
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper,
while open to discrepancies in the helpee's behavior, do not
relate directly and specifically to these discrepancies.
Example:

The helper may simply raise questions without
pointing up the diverging directions of the possible answers.

In summary, while the helper does not disregard discrepancies in the helpee's behavior, he does not point up
the directions of these discrepancies. Level 3 constitutes
the minimum level of facilitative interpersonal functioning.
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Level 4
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper
attend directly and specifically to the discrepancies in the
helpee's behavior.
Example:

The helper confronts the helpee directly and explicitly with discrepancies in the helpee's behavior.

In summary, the helper specifically addresses himself to discrepancies in the helpee's behavior.
Level 5
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper
are keenly and continually attuned to the discrepancies in
the helpee's behavior.
Example:

The helper confronts the helpee with helpee discrepancies in a sensitive and perceptive manner
whenever they appear.

In summary, the helper does not neglect any potentially fruitful inquiry into the discrepancies in the
helpee's behavior.

SCALE 7
IMMEDIACY OF RELATIONSHIP IN INTERPERSONAL
PROCESSES:

A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT

Level 1
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper
disregard the content and affect of the helpee's expressions
that have the potential for relating to the helper.
Example:

The helper may simply ignore all helpee communications, whether direct or indirect, that deal with
the helper-helpee relationship.

In summary, the helper simply disregards all of
those helpee messages that are related to the helper.
Level 2
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper
disregard most of the helpee expressions that have the
potential for relating to the helper.
Example:

Even if the helpee is talking about helping personnel in general, the helper may, in general, remain silent or just not relate the content to himself.

In summary, the helper appears to choose to disregard most of those helpee messages that are related to the
helper.
Level 3
The verbal and behavior expressions of the helper,
while open to interpretations of immediacy, do not relate
what the helpee is saying to what is going on between the
helper and the helpee in the immediate moment.
Example:

The helper may make literal responses to or reflections on the helpee's expressions or otherwise
open-minded responses that refer to no one specifically but that might refer to the helper.
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In summary, while the helper does not extend the
helpee's expressions to immediacy, he is not closed to such
interpretations. Level 3 constitutes the minimum level of
facilitative interpersonal functioning.
Level 4
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper
appear cautiously to relate the helpee's expressions
directly to the helper-helpee relationship.
Example:

The helper attempts to relate the helpee's responses to himself, but he does so in a tentative
manner.

In summary, the helper relates the helpee's responses
to himself in an open, cautious manner.
Level 5
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper
relate the helpee's expressions directly to the helperhelpee relationship.
Example:

The helper in a direct and explicit manner relates
the helpee's expressions to himself.

In summary, the helper is not hesitant in making
explicit interpretations of the helper-helpee relationship.)

SCALE 8
HELPEE SELF-EXPLORATION IN INTERPERSONAL
PROCESSES:

A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT

Level 1
The second person does not discuss personally relevant material, either because he has had no opportunity to
do such or because he is actively evading the discussion
even when it is introduced by the first person.
Example:

The second person avoids any self-descriptions or
self-exploration or direct expression of feelings
that would lead him to reveal himself to the first
person.

In summary, for a variety of possible reasons the
second person does not give any evidence of self-exploration.
Level 2
The second person responds with discussion to the introduction of personally relevant material by the first person but does so in a mechanical manner and without the demonstration of emotional feelings.
Example:

The second person simply discusses the material
without exploring the significance or the meaning
of the material or attempting further exploration
of that feeling in an effort to uncover related
feelings or material.

In summary, the second person responds mechanically
and remotely to the introduction of personally relevant
material by the first person.
Level 3
The second person voluntarily introduces discussions
of personally relevant material but does so in a mechanical
manner and without the demonstration of emotional feeling.
Example:

The emotional remoteness and mechanical manner of
the discussion give the discussion a quality of
being rehearsed.
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In summary, the second person introduces personally
relevant material but does so without spontaneity or emotional proximity and without an inward probing to discover
new feelings and experiences.
Level 4
The second person voluntarily introduces discussions
of personally relevant material with both spontaneity and
emotional proximity.
Example:

The voice quality and other characteristics of the
second person are very much "with" the feelings
and other personal materials that are being
verbalized.

In summary, the second person introduces personally
relevant discussions with spontaneity and emotional proximity
but without a distinct tendency toward inward probing to
discover new feelings and experiences.
Level 5
The second person actively and spontaneously engages
in an inward probing to discover new feelings and experiences about himself and his world.
Example:

The second person is searching to discover new
feelings concerning himself and his world even
though at the moment he may perhaps be doing so
fearfully and tentatively.

In summary, the second person is fully and actively
focusing upon himself and exploring himself and his world.

APPENDIX B

Rating Guide for the Interpersonal Skills Scale *
Sample Statement:

"I'm so down and I don't even know why
• • • I mean, I shouldn't be down just
because • • • (pause) there's just no
reason for it."

Response Classification Level

Rating

(refer to above statement for all examples)
1.

Cliche Response: Not related to other's statement.
e.g., "I know lots of people who get sad feelings
too."
Somewhat related to other's
statement.
e.g., "What do you think causes people to get
depressed?"

1.0

Cliche Response:

2.

3.

1.5

Advice Response: Poor advice: no understanding.
e.g., "You should think of the good things in
your life."

2.0

Advice Response: Good advice: no understanding.
e.g., "You know what's on your mind. Just say it!"

2.5

Interchangeable Response: Simple reflective with
.
understanding shown.
e.g., "You're feeling down."
Complete understanding
of feeling and message
of other.
e.g., "You're pretty down and you just don't know
why."

3.0

Interchangeable Response:

4.

High understanding; beginning
initiation.
e.g., "You can't let yourself think about the
things that are causing you to feel so bad."

3.5

Additive Response:

High Understanding; high
initiation.
e.g., "You're feeling really low • • • you have
an idea why • • • but its pretty painful to
think about it."

4.0

Additive Response:

*This

scale is based on the work of Carkhuff

(1969b).
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APPENDIX C

Interpersonal Skills:

A Rating Scale *

Use the following rating scale to rate interpersonal skills:
,
1.0 I 1.5 I 2.0 I 2.5 I 3.0 I 3.5 I 4.0 I 4.5 I 5.0 1
Very Sub- Moderately
Minimally
Markedly
Extremely
tractive
Subtractive facilitafacilita- Facilitative
tive
tive
Self-presentation Skills:
Self-disclosure: Trainee appropriately discloses himself to others with the goal of fostering relationships.
This is done in a sense of mutuality and emerges from
the ongoing context of the relationship.
Concreteness: He deals in specific, concrete feelings
and behavior; he deals in relevant behavior (not "storytelling"); he deals in specific details and specific
instances
Expression of feeling:
He expresses his emotions as
they arise in a constructive non-manipulative manner;
directly communicating his feelings.
Responding Skills:
Primary Accurate Empathy: Trainee communicates an accurate understanding of the feelings, behavior, and experiences which the other person explicitly communicates.
He experiences the "world" of the other and communicates
this understanding.
Genuineness: He responds in a spontaneous, role-free
manner. He is assertive in communicating without being
duly aggressive.
Respect:
(warmth, being "for"): He communicates respect for the other person (especially through his efforts to understand the other person's experience). He
is unconditional or conditional in his regard as the
phase and content of the relationship demands.

*This

scale is based on the work of Egan (1976).
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Challenge Skills:
Advanced Accurate Empathy: Trainee accurately communicates not only what the other person states and expresses
but also what he implies or leaves unstated or doesn't
clearly express.
Confrontation: He invites the other person to examine
his behavior and its consequences more carefully; he
challenges the strengths rather than the weaknesses of
the other; he points out the discrepancies in the
other's lifestyle.
Immediacy: He explores the here-and-now, the relationship between himself and others, in a direct and constructive manner.

APPENDIX D

THE ROTTER INTERNAL-EXTERNAL LOCUS
OF CONTROL SCALE *
Instructions: Please check the alternative that best describes what happens to you or how you feel.
There are no
right or wrong answers.
1.

A.
B.

2.

A.
B.

3.

A.
B.

4.

A.
B.

5.

A.
B.

6.

A.
B.

7.

A.
B.

Children get into trouble because their parents
punish them too much.
The trouble with most children nowadays is that
their parents are too easy with them.
Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are
partly due to bad luck.
People's misfortunes result from the mistakes
they make.
One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people don't take enough interest in politics.
There will always be wars, no matter how hard
people try to prevent them.
In the long run people get the respect they deserve in this world.
Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes
unrecognized no matter how hard he tries.
The idea that teachers are unfair to students is
nonsense.
Most students don't realize the extent to which
their grades are influenced by accidental happenings.
Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader.
Capable people who fail to become leaders have
not taken advantage of their opportunities.
No matter how hard you try some people just don't
like you.
People who can't get others to like them don't
understand how to get along with others.

*From

Rotter (1966).
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8.

A.
B.

9.

A.
B.

10.

A.
B.

11.

A.
B.

12.

A.
B.

13.

A.

Heredity plays the major role in determining
one's personality.
It is one's experiences in life which determine
what they're like.
I have often found that what is going to happen
will happen.
Trusting to fate has never turned out as well
for me as making a decision to take a definite
course of action.
In the case of the well prepared student there
is rarely if ever such a thing as an unfair test.
Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work that studying is really
useless.
Becoming a success
luck has little or
Getting a good job
the right place at

is a matter of hard work;
nothing to do with it.
depends mainly on being in
the right time.

The average citizen can have an influence in
government decisions.
This world is run by the few people in power,
and there is not much the little guy can do
about it.

B.

When I make plans, I am almost certain that I
can make them work.
It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter of
good or bad fortune anyhow.

14.

A.
B.

There are certain people who are just no good.
There is some good in everybody.

15.

A.

In my case getting what I want has little or
nothing to do with luck.
Many times we might just as well decide what to
do by flipping a coin.

B.
16.

A.
B.

Who gets to be boss often depends on who was
lucky enough to be in the right place first.
Getting people to do the right thing depends
upon ability; luck has little or nothing to do
with it.
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17.

A.
B.

18.

A.
B.

As far as world affairs are concerned, most of
us are the victims of forces we can neither understand, nor control.
By taking an active part in political and social
affairs the people can control world events.
Most people don't realize the extent to which
their lives are controlled by accidental happenings.
There really is no such thing as "luck."

19.

A.
--B.

One should always be willing to admit mistakes.
It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes.

20.

A.

It is hard to know whether or not a person
really likes you.
How many friends you have depends upon how nice
a person you are.

B.
21.

A.
B.

22.

A.
B.

23.

A.
B.

24.

A.
B.

25.

A.
B.

26.

A.
B.

In the long run the bad things that happen to us
are balanced by the good ones.
Most misfortunes are the result of lack of
ability, ignorance, laziness, or all three.
With enough effort we can wipe out political
corruption.
It is difficult for people to have much control
over the things politicians do in office.
Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive
at the grades they give.
There is a direct connection between how hard I
study and the grades I get.
A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what they should do.
A good leader makes it clear to everybody what
their jobs are.
Many times I feel that I have little influence
over the things that happen to me.
It is impossible for me to believe that chance
or luck plays an important role in my life.
People are lonely because they don't try to be
friendly.
There's not much use in trying too hard to please
people, if they like you, they like you.
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27.

A.

B.
28.

A.
---B.

29.

A.

B.

There is too much emphasis on athletics in high
school.
Team sports are an excellent way to build
character.
What happens to me is my own doing.
Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the direction my life is taking.
Most of the time I can't understand why politicians behave the way they do.
In the long run the people are responsible for
bad government on a national as well as on a
local level.
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